Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Conceptual role: semantics of the conceptual role - is about representations in connection with functions of thinking instead of functions of language use. - Locus classicus Ned Block conceptual role semantics, CRS. See also compositionality, truth functional semantics, inferential semantics, inferentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Conceptual Role - Dictionary of Arguments
II 75 Def "Wide Conceptual Role"/Harman/Field: (Harman 1982)(1): includes causal connections with the environment. It may be part of the conceptual role of "There is a rabbit" that this is typically triggered by rabbits being around. Problem: this is also true then for e.g. "phlogiston is leaking from the cylinder." This could typically be caused by oxygen entering into the cylinder. Field: this shows that this does not introduce any representational properties (reference, truth conditions). >Truth conditions, >Reference, >Truth, >Observation, >Observation sentences, >Theoretical entities, >Theory language. II 76 Conceptual Role/"Not"/Truth Function/Representation/Field: a representational semantics will regard e.g. "not" as a function which reflects the truth on falsehood, and vice versa. Negation/Conceptual Role/Not/Field: but that is not a fact about the conceptual or functional role of "not". >Negation. Conceptual role: is easy to specify here: it is largely given in the inference rules. - But the specification of the conceptual role says nothing about the truth functions. >Truth functions. While there is a sort of supervenience of the representational properties (truth conditions, reference, etc.) on the property of the conceptual role in the logic connections. - But conceptual role and representation cannot be equated. >Representation. II 93 Conceptual Role/Negation/Fact/Field: the fact by virtue of which "it is not the case that" obeys the truth tables, are facts about its conceptual role. II 108 Conceptual Role/Field: includes the verification conditions, but even more, e.g. rules for probability and conceptual consequences that arise from a belief. - But the conceptual role is not enough: it is internalistic and individualistic. - I.e. it does not refer to the outside world and the language community. - We have no "externalist" and no "social" aspects. >Language community. Solution/Field: we could make the (hopefully harmless) assumption that a language user believes something in his own language. Or at least internal analogues thereof without ambiguities. And we assume that this belief relation is possible without a presupposed concept of content. >Content, >Beliefs, >Relation-theory. Deflationism: can agree with that. - Also computational role: describes how beliefs, desires, etc. arise in time. >Computation/Field. II 112 We can say that the conceptual role and the indication relations of the beliefs of other people are relevant to the content of my belief state. - The conceptual role of logic connections is not explained by the truth table. Solution: Reliability: is higher if "or" has the role that corresponds to the truth table. >Reliability theory. Conceptual Role/Logical Operators/Connections: the conceptual role semantics (CRS) can here assume facts or the absence of facts, deflationism cannot. >Deflationism 1. Harman, Gilbert. 1982. "Conceptual Role Semantics". In: Notre dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23, pp. 242-56_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Conceptual Role
